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America's Future Grand Strategy 
I T h e  Soviet Union's 
collapse transformed the international system dramatically, but there has 
been no corresponding change in U.S. grand strategy. In terms of ambitions, 
interests, and alliances, the United States is following the same grand strategy 
it pursued from 1945 until 1991: that of preponderance.' Whether this strategy 
will serve U.S. interests in the early twenty-first century is problematic. Hence, 
in this article my purpose is to stimulate a more searching debate about future 
U.S. grand strategic options.2 To accomplish this, I compare the strategy of 
preponderance to a proposed alternative grand strategy: offshore balancing. 
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1. I have borrowed Melvyn P. Leffler's description of post-World War I1 grand strategy as a 
strategy of preponderance to reflect what I demonstrate is the underlying continuity between 
America's postwar and post-Cold War strategies. See Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: 
National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 1992). 
2. The post-1989 literature on US. grand strategy includes Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: 
America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," Znternational Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991), 
pp. 5-53; Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 4 
(January/February 1991), pp. 3-17; Joseph Joffe, "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American 
Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," Znternational Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 94-117; 
Zalmay Khalilzad, "US. Grand Strategies: Implications for the World, " in Zalmay Khalilzad, ed., 
Strategic Appraisal 1996 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996), pp. 11-38; and Stephen Van Evera, 
"Why Europe Matters and the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1990), pp. 1-51. Also see John J. Kohut 111, Steven 
J. Lambakis, Keith B. Payne, Robert S. Rudney, Willis A. Stanley, Bernard C. Victory, and Linda H. 
Vlahos, "Alternative Grand Strategy Options for the United States," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 14, 
No. 4 (October-December 1995), pp. 361-420, which usefully describes what the authors see as the 
current U.S. grand strategy and three alternative grand strategies, but does not examine the 
theoretical premises underlying these four grand strategies. Also, the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the four grand strategies are not compared. 
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My argument for adopting an alternative grand strategy is prospective: 
although sustainable for perhaps another decade, the strategy of preponder- 
ance cannot be maintained much beyond that period. The changing distribu- 
tion of power in the international system-specifically, the relative decline of 
US. power and the corresponding rise of new great powers-will render the 
strategy untenable. The strategy also is being undermined because the robust- 
ness of America’s extended deterrence strategy is eroding rapidly. Over time, 
the costs and risks of the strategy of preponderance will rise to unacceptably 
high levels. The time to think about alternative grand strategies is now-before 
the United States is overtaken by events. 
An offshore balancing strategy would have two crucial objectives: minimiz- 
ing the risk of U.S. involvement in a future great power (possibly nuclear) 
war, and enhancing America’s relative power in the international system. Capi- 
talizing on its geopolitically insular position, the United States would disen- 
gage from its current alliance commitments in East Asia and Europe. By 
sharply circumscribing its overseas engagement, the United States would be 
more secure and more powerful as an offshore balancer in the early twenty- 
first century than it would be if it continues to follow the strategy of prepon- 
derance. 
In advocating this strategy, I do not deprecate those who believe that bad 
things (e.g., increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States 
abandons its strategy of preponderance. Indeed, they may; however, that is 
only half of the argument. The other half, seldom acknowledged by champions 
of preponderance, is that bad things-perhaps far worse things-ould happen 
if the United States stays on its present grand strategic course. Grand strategies 
must be judged by the amount of security they provide; whether, given inter- 
national systemic constraints, they are sustainable; their cost; the degree of risk 
they entail; and their tangible and intangible domestic effects. Any serious 
debate about U.S. grand strategy must use these criteria to assess the compara- 
tive merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors. I hope to 
foster an awareness that fairly soon the strategy of preponderance will be 
unable to pass these tests. 
This article is structured as follows. First, I analyze the strategy of prepon- 
derance, paying particular attention to its theoretical underpinnings, causal 
logic, and policy components. Second, I demonstrate the strategy’s weaknesses. 
Third, I outline the elements of an alternative grand strategy, offshore balanc- 
ing, and show why it would be a better strategy for the United States to follow 
in the twenty-first century. 
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Theory and Grand Strategy: The Strategy of Preponderance 
Grand strategy is a three-step process: determining a state's vital security 
interests; identifying the threats to those interests; and deciding how best to 
employ the state's political, military, and economic resources to protect those 
 interest^.^ The outcome of the process, however, is indeterminate: the specific 
grand strategy that emerges will reflect policymakers' views of how the world 
works. Hence debates about grand strategy also are debates about interna- 
tional relations theory. Because theories are not monolithic, competing grand 
strategies can emanate not only from rival theories but also from the same 
theoretical approach. Thus both competing strategies I consider in this article- 
preponderance and offshore balancing-are rooted in the realist tradition not- 
withstanding their sharply different policy implications. In this section, I 
analyze the strategy of preponderance to clarify the realist premises upon 
which the strategy is based and demonstrate how its policy prescriptions are 
deduced from these premises. 
U.S. Grand Strategy: A Pattern of Continuity 
The United States has pursued the same grand strategy, preponderance, since 
the late 1940s. The key elements of this strategy are creation and maintenance 
of a U.S.-led world order based on preeminent U.S. political, military, and 
economic power, and on American values; maximization of U.S. control over 
the international system by preventing the emergence of rival great powers in 
Europe and East Asia; and maintenance of economic interdependence as a vital 
U.S. security interest. The logic of the strategy is that interdependence is the 
paramount interest the strategy promotes; instability is the threat to interde- 
pendence; and extended deterrence is the means by which the strategy deals 
with this threat. 
The quest for world order has been integral to U.S. grand strategy since at 
least 1945. The grand strategic equation of world order with U.S. security 
reflects a historically rooted belief that to be secure, the United States must 
extend abroad both its power and its political and economic institutions and 
values? Thus, even in the mid to late 1940s, the driving force behind U.S. 
3. This definition is similar to Leffler's and Barry Posen's. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. ix, 
and Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World 
Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 13. 
4. Driving U.S. strategy is the belief that "America must have a favorable climate for its institutions 
to thrive, and perhaps even for them to survive." Lloyd C. Gardner, A Covenant with Power: America 
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policy was more basic than the mere containment of the Soviet Union? which 
explains why, despite the Cold War‘s end, the United States remains committed 
to the strategy of preponderance. 
Since the end of World War 11, the United States has attempted to prevent 
the emergence of new geopolitical rivals. In the 1940s, of course, it accepted 
the reality of Soviet power. Short of preventive war (a thought entertained by 
some U.S. policymakers), the United States could not prevent the Soviet 
Union’s ascendance to superpower status6 From 1945 on, however, the United 
States was the sole great power in its own sphere of influence, the non-Soviet 
world. As the historian Melvyn P. Leffler points out, U.S. policymakers be- 
lieved that ”neither an integrated Europe nor a united Germany nor an inde- 
pendent Japan must be permitted to emerge as third force or a neutral bloc.”7 
Leffler’s argument is not idiosyncratic. Observing that the United States 
”expected to lead the new world order” after 1945, the diplomatic historian 
John Lewis Gaddis states: ”Few historians would deny, today, that the United 
States did expect to dominate the international scene after World War 11, and 
that it did so well before the Soviet Union emerged as a clear and present 
antagonist.”8 It could be argued, of course, that far from suppressing the 
reemergence of competing power centers within its sphere, the United States 
encouraged their emergence by facilitating the postwar economic recoveries of 
Western Europe and Japan. While helping its allies rebuild economically, how- 
ever, the United States maintained tight political control over them. Washing- 
ton wanted Western Europe and Japan to be strong enough to help contain the 
Soviet Union; it did not want them to become strong enough to challenge its 
and World Order from Wilson to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 27. The belief 
that the United States is alone in a hostile world leads it to alleviate this chronic insecurity by 
seeking complete immunity from external threat. William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of 
Life: A n  Essay on the Causes and Character of America‘s Present Predicament along with a Few Thoughts 
About an Alternative (New York Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 53. Also see James Chace and 
Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable: The Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars (New York: 
Summit Books, 1988), p. 12. 
5. The link between America’s security, its preponderance, and an American-led world order was 
articulated in NSC-68, which states that the purpose of American power is “to foster a world 
environment in which the American system can survive and flourish” and the strategy of prepon- 
derance is ”a policy which [the United States] would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet 
Union.” NSC-68 in Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on 
American Policy and Strategy, 2945-2950 (New York Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 401. 
6. See Russell D. Buhite and Wm. Christopher Hamel, ”War for Peace: The Question of American 
Preventive War against the Soviet Union, 1945-1955,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer 
7. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 17. 
8. John Lewis Gaddis, ”The Tragedy of Cold War History,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 17, No. 1 
(Winter 1993), pp. M. 
1990), pp. 367-385. 
leadership. The United States was especially concerned with circumscribing 
the resurgent power of (West) Germany and Japan. Thus, as the political 
scientist Wolfram Hanreider observed, America’s post-World War I1 strategy 
was double containment (containment of the Soviet Union and of Germany and 
Japan)? Although the postwar American empire was an “empire by invita- 
tion,’’ it was an empire nonetheless, and the United States sought to maintain 
its geopolitically privileged position vis-a-vis Western Europe and Japan.” 
Economic interdependence has played a central role in U.S. grand strategy 
since 1945.” Indeed, the strategy of preponderance’s hallmark is the interplay 
of security and economic factors.” Even before the Cold War’s onset, the 
United States “deliberately fostered the economic interdependence of the major 
powers in order to ensure U.S. security and pr~sperity.”’~ The centrality of 
interdependence in post-1945 foreign policy is explained in part by economic 
considerations. U.S. policymakers have come to believe that America’s pros- 
perity depends on its access to overseas markets and raw  material^.'^ Even 
more important, however, are the perceived positive political and security 
externalities that flow from interdependence. 
As World War I1 drew to a close, U.S. decision makers subscribed to three 
beliefs about interdependence’s positive externalities. First, they embraced the 
9. The term ”double containment” is from Wolfram Hanreider, Germany, Europe, and America (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989). 
10. See Geir Lundestad, The American “Empire” and Other Studies of U S .  Foreign Policy in a 
Comparative Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
11. Diplomatic historians agree that economic factors played an important role in postwar Ameri- 
can foreign policy but disagree about whether geostrategic or economic considerations were 
accorded priority in U.S. strategy. Compare Leffler, A Preponderance of Power with Bruce Cumings, 
”The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History,” in Michael J. Hogan, ed., America in the World: The 
Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). The crucial point, sometimes lost in the debate, is the seamless interconnection of 
strategy and economics. 
12. As Robert A. Pollard and Samuel F. Wells, Jr. observe: ”The global and comprehensive nature 
of American foreign economic policies and ideas makes it difficult to distinguish among the 
political, strategic, and economic sources of American conduct in the postwar years.” Robert A. 
Pollard and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., ”1945-1960: The Era of American Economic Hegemony,” in 
William Becker and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., eds., Economics and World Power (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), p. 387. 
13. Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War (New York Columbia 
University Press, 1985), p. 2. 
14. Brent Scowcroft argues that American prosperity depends on the global economy, and there- 
fore the “U.S. cannot prosper amid chaos and conflict.” Brent Scowcroft, “Who Can Harness 
History?” New York Times, July 2,1993, p. A15. Then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated: ”We 
are a trading nation, and our prosperity is directly linked to peace and stability in the world. . . . 
Simply stated, the worldwide market that we’re part of cannot thrive where regional violence, 
instability and aggression put it in peril.” Dick Cheney, ”The Military We Need in the Future,” 
Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 59, No. 1 (October 15, 1992), p. 13. 
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traditional perspective of commercial liberalism that by increasing prosperity, 
an open international trading system decreases the risk of war by raising its 
costs. Second, they believed a key ”lesson” of the 1930s was that economic 
nationalism (autarky, rival trade blocs) led to totalitarianism and militarism in 
Germany and Japan, and thus was an important cause of geopolitical instabil- 
ity. An open postwar international trading system would prevent a replay of 
the 1930s by strengthening the domestic political position of elites who would 
be predisposed by economic interest and ideology to pursue pacific foreign 
policies. Third, they believed that World War II’s origins were rooted in eco- 
nomic causes (i.e., competition for territorial control of markets and raw ma- 
terials). An open international trading system would eliminate the need to 
capture resources and markets by providing nondiscriminatory access to all 
states. The Cold War added a fourth reason to regard economic interdepend- 
ence as a vital American interest: an open international trading system would 
contribute to peace and international stability in the non-Soviet world, and 
hence reduce its vulnerability to communism. 
Although the Cold War has ended, the United States remains wedded to the 
strategy of preponderance. The Bush administration’s “new world order” and 
the Clinton administration’s strategy of ”engagement and enlargement” reflect 
Washington’s continuing aspiration to maintain an international system 
shaped by America’s power and values. The US. foreign policy community 
understands that little can be done to prevent the emergence of a new great 
power challenger (China) outside the U.S. sphere of influence. Within its own 
sphere, however, the United States remains determined to suppress the rise of 
rival powers: Germany and Japan are to be contained by embedding them 
firmly in U.S.-dominated security and economic  framework^.'^ Now, as during 
the Cold War, the U.S. military protectorate’s purpose in Europe and East Asia 
is to facilitate interdependence by removing the security dilemma and relative 
15. Arguments that the post4old War purpose of American security commitments in Europe and 
East Asia is to contain Germany and Japan, respectively, and thus prevent the ”renationalization” 
of their foreign and security policies, are legion. On Germany, see, for example, Robert J. Art, “Why 
Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 
(Spring 1996), pp. 140,  and Charles L. Glaser, ”Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrange- 
ments for Europe,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-50. On Japan, see 
Richard K. Betts, ”Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold 
War,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5 M ,  and Aaron L. Friedberg, 
”Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 
(Winter 1993/94), pp. 31-32. In 1990 the then commander of U.S. Marine Corps bases in Japan, 
Maj. Gen. Henry C. Stackpole 111, bluntly explained the reason for the American military presence 
in East Asia: “No one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan. So we are the cap in the bottle, if you 
will.” Quoted in Sam Jameson, “A Reluctant Superpower Agonizes Over Military,” Los Angeles 
Times, August 1, 1995, p. H4. 
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gains issue from relations among the states in Washington's orbit. U.S. security 
commitments continue to be extended beyond the European and East Asian 
core into the periphery. Preponderance's strategic imperatives are the same as 
they were during the post-World War I1 era: pacification and reassurance in 
Europe and East Asia, and protection of these regions from the contagion of 
instability in the periphery. 
Interests, Threats, and Means 
Preponderance is a realist strategy that subsumes two distinct approaches: 
offensive realism and defensive realism.I6 Offensive and defensive realists define 
U.S. interests identically and agree broadly about the threats to them. Offensive 
and defensive realists disagree, however, about the relative salience of "hard" 
versus "soft" power in the strategy of preponderance, and consequently, they 
have disparate views of the means required to sustain the ~trategy.'~ 
16. John J. Mearsheimer is the leading academic proponent of offensive realism. See John J. 
Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of Liberal Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 
(Winter 1993/94), pp. 9-14. For applications of offensive realism to US. grand strategy, see Patrick 
E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Ensuring No Rivals Develop, Nau York Times, March 8, 1992, 
p. A1 [draft FY 1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance]; Regional Defense Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 1992); and 2992 Summer 
Study (Organized by the director, Net Assessment, held at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport 
R.I., August 5-13, 1991). Also see Robert Kagan, "The Case for Global Activism," Commentary, Vol. 
98, No. 3 (September 1994); Robert Kagan, "A Retreat from Power?" Commentary, Vol. 100, No. 1 
(July 1995); Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs: America and the World, 
Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990-91); William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign 
Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July/August 1996), pp. 1€&32; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Losing 
the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, 
No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 87-107; and Khalilzad, "US. Grand Strategies." 
Leading academic proponents of defensive realism include Barry Posen, Jack Snyder, Stephen 
Van Evera, and Stephen M. Walt. For scholarly works embodying defensive realism, see Fareed 
Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), 
p. 191, fn. 34. Another important defensive realist work, reviewed in Zakaria's article, is Jack 
Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1991). For applications of defensive realism to U.S. grand strategy, see A National Security 
Strategy of Engagements and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1995); United States 
Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Office 
of International Security Affairs, 1995); Anthony Lake, "Laying the Foundations for a New Ameri- 
can Century" (The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, April 25, 1996); Anthony Lake, 
"Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War 
World (The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, March 6, 1996); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound 
to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 
"The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 (July/August 1995), pp. 90-102; 
and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Conflicts After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 
1996), pp. 5-24. 
17. On the distinction between hard and soft power, see Nye, Bound to Lead. 
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Offensive and defensive realists concur that continued American hegemony 
is desirable; however, they employ different theoretical assumptions to support 
this shared conclusion. Offensive realists believe that states should attempt to 
maximize their relative power to gain security. They believe that in a harsh, 
competitive world, security rests on hard power (military power and its eco- 
nomic underpinnings) and it is best to be number one. For them, systemic 
stability (the absence of war, security competitions, and proliferation) is a 
function of U.S. military power. They contend that the chances of future great 
power war will remain low if U.S. hegemony is preserved but will be high if 
the international system becomes multipolar. Offensive realists claim that oth- 
ers will accept U.S. hegemony because they must do so, and they derive 
important security and economic benefits from U.S. hegemony, and further, 
because they have no choice. While not deprecating the importance of Ameri- 
can liberal democratic values, offensive realists do not believe these values 
contribute to peace and stability independently of the military power that is 
the foundation of U.S. hegemony. 
Defensive realists view international politics more optimistically. As Fareed 
Zakaria says, defensive realism ”assumes that the international system pro- 
vides incentives only for moderate, reasonable behavior.”18 Defensive realists 
argue that states seek to maximize their security, not their power, and that 
security is actually plentiful in the international system. From these assump- 
tions they conclude that power-maximizing behavior by states (overexpansion) 
results from cognitive factors (misperception) or domestic political pathologies 
rather than from international systemic constraints. Hence aggression can be 
cured by rooting out the unit-level deformations that purportedly cause it. The 
spread of democracy, economic interdependence, and the development of 
international institutions can help accomplish this task. Thus in its diagnosis 
of, and prescription for, ”irrational” state behavior, defensive realism con- 
verges with liberal international relations theory. 
An apparent tension exists between defensive realism’s theoretical assump- 
tions and its professed grand strategic goal of maintaining U.S. preponderance. 
Defensive realists reconcile strategy with theory by invoking three arguments. 
First, ”balance-of-threat” theory is used to support the proposition that others 
will not balance against a hegemonic United States.” Second, defensive realists 
18. Zakaria, ”Realism and Domestic Politics,” p. 190. 
19. On balance-of-threat theory, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1987). For a critique of balance-of-threat theory’s applicability in a unipolar world, 
see Christopher Layne, ”The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International 
Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 11-15. 
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argue that precisely because the United States does manifest concern for their 
interests, other states will want to bandwagon with it. Third, by using its soft 
power-the appeal of American values and culture-the United States can 
reduce the risk that others will regard it as a threat. For defensive realists, a 
hegemon's power rests not only on its military and economic power, but also 
on others' acceptance of its norms and principles.20 Defensive realist advocates 
of preponderance invoke these arguments to support the claim that American 
hegemony does not threaten other states' security; is essential to maintaining 
a stable international system from which all states benefit; and will be willingly 
accepted by all except "rogue" states (nondemocratic states that do not accept 
the norms that the United States has imposed on the international system). 
The strategy of preponderance assumes that the United States has a vital 
"milieu" interest in maintaining stability in the international system.21 Under- 
lying the strategy is fear of what might happen in a world no longer shaped 
by predominant U.S. power. Continued American hegemony is important 
because it is seen as the prerequisite for systemic stability (primacy is world 
order). Instability is dangerous because it threatens the link that connects U.S. 
security to the strategic and economic interests furthered by interdependence. 
Interdependence is an overriding U.S. interest for economic reasons and, more 
important, for politico-military reasons: it is viewed as both a cause and a 
consequence of peace and stability in the international system. Indeed, the role 
of interdependence in the strategy of preponderance is tautological: Inter- 
dependence is a vital interest because it leads to peace and stability (and 
prosperity); however, peace and stability must preexist in the international 
system order for interdependence to take root. 
Geographically, the strategy of preponderance identifies Europe, East Asia, 
and the Persian Gulf as regions in which the United States has vital security 
interests. Europe and East Asia (the zone of peace and prosperity) are impor- 
tant because they are the regions from which new great powers could emerge 
and where future great power war could occur; central to the functioning of 
an interdependent international economic system; and vital to U.S. prosperity. 
The Persian Gulf is important because of oil. Geographically, these three 
regions constitute America's vital interests; however, its security interests are 
20. See John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power," in 
David P. Rapkin, ed., World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p. 52. 
21. For the definition of "milieu goals," see Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays in 
International Politics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 7S77. 
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not confined to these regions. The United States must also be concerned with 
the peripheries because turmoil there could affect the core. 
The strategy of preponderance identifies the rise of new great powers and 
the spillover of instability from strategically peripheral areas to regions of core 
strategic interest as the two main threats to U.S. interests in stability and 
interdependence. The emergence of new great powers would have two dele- 
terious consequences for the United States. First, new great powers could 
become aspiring hegemons and, if successful, would seriously threaten U.S. 
security?' Offensive and defensive realists concur that China is the state most 
likely to emerge as a hegemonic challenger in the early twenty-first century. 
Offensive realists believe that the United States should respond to the prospect 
of emerging Chinese power by moving now to contain BeijingZ3 While holding 
the containment option in reserve, defensive realists prefer to engage China 
now in the hope that democratization and interdependence will have melio- 
rating effects on Beijing's foreign policy.24 
Second, the emergence of new great powers is always a destabilizing geo- 
political phenomenon. Although the United States may have to acquiesce in 
China's rise to great power status, the strategy of preponderance clearly aims 
to prevent the great power emergence of Germany and Japan. U.S. policymak- 
ers fear that a "renationalized" Japan or Germany could trigger an adverse 
geopolitical chain reaction. For their neighbors, resurgent German and Japa- 
nese power would revive the security dilemma (dormant during the Cold 
War). At best, the ensuing security competitions that could occur in Europe 
and East Asia would make cooperation more difficult. At worst, renationaliza- 
tion could fuel a cycle of rising tensions and arms racing (possibly including 
nuclear proliferation) that would undermine regional stability and perhaps 
lead to war. Either way, however, U.S. strategic and economic interests in 
interdependence would be imperiled. 
22. See Khalilzad, "US. Grand Strategies," p. 18. 
23. See Jacob Heilbrunn, "The Next Cold War," The Nau Republic, November 20, 1995, pp. 27-30; 
Gideon Rachman, "Containing China," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 129- 
139; and Arthur Waldron, "Deterring China," Commentary, Vol. 100, No. 4 (October 1995), pp. 17-21. 
24. See, for example, Audry Kurth Cronin and Patrick Cronin, "The Realistic Engagement of 
China," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 141-169; Kenneth Lieberthal, "The 
China Challenge," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 6 (November/December 1995), pp. 35-49; James L. 
Richardson, "Asia-Pacific: The Case for Geopolitical Optimism," The National Interest, No. 38 
(Winter 1994/1995), pp. 28-39; and Jeffrey E. Garten, "Power Couple," New York Times, January 
15, 1996, p. All. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. also is an advocate of engagement. 
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The strategy's aversion to the emergence of new great powers reflects the 
belief that multipolar international systems are unstable and war prone.25 As 
former Pentagon official Zalmay Khalilzad argues, "U.S. leadership [i.e., con- 
tinued U.S. hegemony] would be more conducive to global stability than a 
bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system."26 Advocates of preponder- 
ance regard multipolarity with trepidation because they embrace the realist 
assumptions that in multipolar systems balancing may fail (leading to war) 
because of coordination and collective action problems, and difficulties in 
calculating relative power relationships acc~ra te ly .~~ 
Instability in the peripheries (caused by failed states or by internal conflict 
triggered by ethnic, religious, or national strife) can also jeopardize America's 
interest in international stability. Turmoil in the periphery could prompt Amer- 
ica's allies to act independently to maintain order (again raising the specter of 
renationalization), or could ripple back into the core and undercut prosperity 
by disrupting the economic links that bind the United States to Europe and 
East Asia. 
U.S. security guarantees to Europe and East Asia-implemented by ex- 
tended deterrence-are the means by which the strategy of preponderance 
maintains a benign international political order conducive to interdependence. 
Through extended deterrence, the United States retains the primary responsi- 
bility for defending German and Japanese security interests both in the core 
and in the periphery. The United States thereby negates German and Japanese 
incentives to renationalize their foreign and security policies. Thus, to imple- 
ment the strategy of preponderance successfully, the United States "must 
account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage 
them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established 
political or economic order."28 
The strategy of preponderance is expensive. Offensive realists (who regard 
hard power as the basis of U.S. hegemony) believe the United States is not 
spending enough on defense. Their recommended annual defense spending 
25. The most compelling articulation of the view that multipolar systems are fundamentally 
unstable is Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future." 
26. Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment?" p. 94. 
27. On why balancing sometimes fails, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics 
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 164-165; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 15- 
16; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 123- 
128; and Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 266-279. 
28. Tyler, "US. Strategy Plan" (emphasis added). 
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increases vary from William Kristol and Robert Kagan’s proposed $60-80 
billion (an increase of plus 1 percent of gross national product [GNPI above 
current spending) to the $140 billion recommended in the Agenda for America 
(which would amount to a defense hike of just under 2 percent of GNI‘Lz9 
Defensive realists (who assign a greater role to soft power in maintaining U.S. 
preponderance) want to keep defense spending at approximately its current 
level. (At present, the Clinton administration projects that U.S. defense spend- 
ing in fiscal year 1997 will amount to about 3.8 percent of GNP.) 
Preponderance in the Post-Cold War World: A Critique 
In this section I critique the strategy of preponderance, focusing on interde- 
pendence’s central geopolitical role in American grand strategy. Interdepend- 
ence leads to strategic overextension, encourages threat inflation, and forces 
the United States to rely on an increasingly problematic extended deterrence 
strategy. 
The strategy’s fixation with international stability stems from its concern 
with ensuring that conditions exist in which interdependence can survive and 
flourish. The causal logic of commercial liberalism holds that economic inter- 
dependence leads to peace. The causal logic of preponderance, however, re- 
flects a different view of the relationship between peace and interdependence: 
it is peace-specifically the international security framework the United States 
has maintained from 1945 to the present-that makes economic interdepend- 
ence possible. As former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye, Jr. puts it: 
Political order is not sufficient to explain economic prosperity, but it is neces- 
sary. Analysts who ignore the importance of this political order are like people 
who forget the importance of the oxygen they breathe. Security is like oxy- 
gen-you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs 
there is nothing else that you will think about?’ 
29. Kristol and Kagan, ”Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” p. 25, and Haley Barbour, Agenda 
for America: A Republican Direction for the Future Washington, D.C.: Regenery Press, 1996). For a 
discussion of the Agenda for America and other recent Republican foreign and defense policy 
proposals, see Jonathan Clarke, ”Gone to the Lake: Republicans and Foreign Policy,” The National 
Interest, No. 44 (Summer 1996), pp. 34-45. 
30. Nye, “The Case for Deep Engagement,” p. 91. Art makes a similar argument for post-Cold 
War American military engagement in Europe. Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United 
States,” p. 36. Because interdependence requires the United States to maintain an extensive over- 
seas military presence (and occasionally to use force to maintain the security environment that 
interdependence requires), it could be said that interdependence is like carbon monoxide: it is not 
noticeable until it kills. 
International Security 2 2 : ~  I 98 
Interdependence and Security: An Overlooked Connection 
There is a tight linkage-too often neglected by many international relations 
theorists-between security and economic interdependence. I call this the 
”security/interdependence nexus.” To preserve an international environment 
conducive to economic interdependence, the United States must engage in an 
extended deterrence strategy that undertakes to defend its allies’ vital interests 
by protecting them from hostile powers, threats emanating in the periphery, 
and each other. The need to rely on extended deterrence to maintain the 
conditions in which interdependence can take root leads inexorably to strategic 
overextension: the United States must extend deterrence to secure interde- 
pendence against threats emanating in both the core and the periphery, and 
the synergy between credibility concerns and threat inflation causes the United 
States to expand the scope of its security commitments. Economic interdepend- 
ence therefore brings with it an increased risk of war and a decrease in 
America’s relative power. 
INTERDEPENDENCE AND STRATEGIC OVEREXTENSION 
The strategy of preponderance assumes that the international system will be 
relatively orderly and stable if the United States defends others’ vital interests, 
but would become disorderly and unstable if others acquired the means to 
defend their own vital interests. Thus, to ensure a post-Cold War geopolitical 
setting conductive to interdependence, the United States “will retain the pre- 
eminent responsibility for selectively addressing those wrongs which threaten 
not only our interests but those of our allies or friends, which could seriously 
unsettle international  relation^."^^ The corollary is that the United States must 
defend its allies’ interests in both the core and in the periphery. Two cases 
illustrate how the security/interdependence nexus invariably leads to U.S. 
strategic overextension: the United States’ role in Indochina from 1948 to 1954 
and its current intervention in Bosnia. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, America’s Cold War strategic imperatives 
required Japan’s economic recovery, which U.S. policymakers believed de- 
pended on Japan’s access to both export markets and raw materials in South- 
east Asia.32 The Truman and Eisenhower administrations understood that, for 
31. “Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan” (emphasis added). 
32. This discussion is based on William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic 
Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 2947-2955 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); Lloyd 
C .  Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: From World War I1 Through Dienbienphu (New York W.W. Norton, 
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America’s Asian strategy to succeed, the United States had to guarantee 
Japan’s military and economic security. This security/interdependence nexus- 
specifically, the U.S. strategic interest in defending Japan’s economic access to 
Southeast Asia-propelled America’s deepening involvement in Indochina. 
Notwithstanding its lack of intrinsic economic and strategic importance, 
Indochina became the focal point of U.S. policy because of ”domino theory” 
concerns.33 The United States regarded Indochina as a fire wall needed to 
prevent the more economically vital parts of the region-especially Malaya 
and Indonesia-from falling under communist control. Washington’s concern 
was that the economic repercussions of toppling dominoes would have geo- 
political consequences: if Japan were cut off from Southeast Asia, the resulting 
economic hardship might cause domestic instability in Japan and result in 
Tokyo drifting out of the U.S. orbit. The connection between Japan’s geopoliti- 
cal orientation, its economic recovery, and its access to Southeast Asia-that is, 
the belief that core and periphery are economically and strategically interde- 
pendent-catalyzed Washington’s support of France during the First Indochina 
War and, after 1954, its support of a noncommunist state in South Vietnam. In 
retrospect, the United States crossed the most crucial threshold on the road to 
the Vietnam War in the early 1950s, when Washington concluded that interde- 
pendence’s strategic requirements (specifically, Japan’s security and prosperity) 
necessitated that containment be extended to Southeast Asia. 
The United States’ 1995 military intervention in Bosnia also illustrates how 
the security/interdependence nexus leads to strategic overextension. The par- 
allels between Indochina and Bosnia are striking even though, unlike the 
perceived interdependence between Japan and Southeast Asia in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, the Balkans’ economic importance to Western Europe is nil 
1988); Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 
2949-2954 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995); Leffler, A Preponderance of Power; 
Ronald L. McGlothen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U S .  Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1993); Andrew J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast 
Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of 
Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Pollard and 
Wells, ”American Economic Hegemony”; Michael Schaller, “Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied 
Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia,” Journal of American History, Vol. 69, No. 
2 (Summer 1982), pp. 392414; Howard B. Schonberger, ”The Cold War and the American Empire 
in Asia,” Radical History Review, Vol. 33 (September 1985), pp. 139-154; Akio Watanabe, ”Southeast 
Asia in U.S.-Japan Relations,” in Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen, eds., The United States and Japan 
in the Postwar World (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989), pp. 3MO.  
33. On the domino theory, see Robert Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” in Robert 
Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition 
in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 20-50. 
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and there is no geopolitical threat in the Balkans that corresponds to Washing- 
ton’s (mistaken) belief that the Vietminh were the agents of a monolithic, 
Kremlin-directed communist bloc. Given these differences the case for inter- 
vention was even less compelling strategically in Bosnia than in Indochina. 
Nevertheless, the rationale for intervention has been the same. U.S. Bosnia 
policy has been justified by invoking arguments-based on domino imagery 
and the perceived need to protect economic interdependence-similar to those 
used to justify U.S. involvement in Indochina in the early 1950s. 
Although a few commentators have contended that U.S. intervention in 
Bosnia was animated by humanitarian concerns, this is not the case. U.S. 
policymakers, including President Bill Clinton, made clear that their overriding 
concerns were to ensure European stability by preventing the Balkan conflict 
from spreading, and to reestablish NATO’s credibility. Indeed, some of prepon- 
derance’s proponents believe that U.S. intervention in Bosnia alone is in- 
sufficient to prevent peripheral instability from spreading to Western Europe. 
To forestall a geopolitical snowball, they contend, it is necessary to enlarge 
NATO by incorporating the states of East Central Europe.34 
These expressed fears about the spillover of instability from Bosnia (or East 
Central Europe) into Europe are, without explication, vague. A number of U.S. 
policymakers and analysts have detailed their concerns, however: they fear 
that spreading instability could affect the United States economically given its 
interdependence with Europe. Thus Senator Richard Lugar (R.-Ind.) urged U.S. 
intervention in Bosnia because “there will be devastating economic effects in 
Europe of a spread of war and, thus, the loss of jobs in this country as we try 
to base a recovery upon our export p~ ten t i a l . ”~~  William E. Odom, former 
Director of the National Security Agency, explicates the perceived significance 
of the link between U.S. interests in interdependence and its concerns for 
European stability and NATO credibility: 
Only a strong NATO with the U.S. centrally involved can prevent Western 
Europe from drifting into national parochialism and eventual regression from 
its present level of economic and political cooperation. Failure to act effectively 
in Yugoslavia will not only affect U.S. security interests but also U.S. economic 
interests. Our economic interdependency with Western Europe creates large 
numbers of American jobs.36 
34. William E. Odom, “NATO’s Expansion: Why the Critics Are Wrong,” The National Interest, No. 
39 (Spring 1995), p. 44. 
35. MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, May 6, 1993, Transcript No. 4622. 
36. William E. Odom, ”Yugoslavia: Quagmire or Strategic Challenge?” Hudson Briefing Paper, No. 
146 (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, November 1992), p. 2. 
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With respect to U.S. commitments, the strategy of preponderance is open- 
ended. Even the strategy’s proponents who acknowledge that there are limits 
to US. security interests are hard-pressed to practice restraint in actual cases. 
Robert Art’s writings are illustrative. In 1991 he argued the only U.S. security 
concern in Europe and the Far East is to ensure that great power war does not 
occur because only conflicts of that magnitude could negatively affect eco- 
nomic interdependence. ”In contrast,” he wrote, “wars among the lesser pow- 
ers in either region (for example, a war between Hungary and Romania over 
Transylvania) would not require American inv~lvement .”~~ Yet in 1996 Art 
suggested that U.S. intervention in Bosnia (by any standard, a ”war among 
lesser powers”) was necessary because the Balkan war had implicated NATO’s 
cohesion and viability and raised doubts about America’s leadership and its 
willingness to remain engaged in Europe.38 Absent continued U.S. involvement 
in European security matters, he argued, NATO would be unable to perform 
its post-Cold War tasks of maintaining a benign security order conducive to 
Western Europe’s continuing politico-economic integration, containing resur- 
gent German power, and preventing the West European states from renation- 
alizing their security policies. 
Indochina and Bosnia demonstrate how the strategy of preponderance ex- 
pands America’s frontiers of insecurity. The security/interdependence nexus 
requires the United States to impose order on, and control over, the interna- 
tional system. To do so, it must continually enlarge the geographic scope of its 
strategic responsibilities to maintain the security of its established interests. As 
Robert H. Johnson observes, this process becomes self-sustaining because each 
time the United States pushes its security interests outward, threats to the new 
security frontier will be apprehended: “uncertainty leads to self-extension, 
which leads in turn to new uncertainty and further self-e~tension.”~~ Core and 
periphery are interdependent strategically; however, while the core remains 
constant, the turbulent frontier in the periphery is constantly expanding. There 
is a suggestive parallel between late-Victorian Britain and the United States to- 
day. The late-nineteenth-century British statesman Lord Rosebery clearly rec- 
ognized that economic interdependence could lead to strategic overextension: 
Our commerce is so universal and so penetrating that scarcely any question 
can arise in any part of the world without involving British interests. This 
consideration, instead of widening rather circumscribes the field of our actions. 
37. Art, “A Defensible Defense,” p. 45. 
38. Art, ”Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO.” 
39. Robert H. Johnson, lmprobable Dangers: U S .  Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 206. 
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For did we not strictly limit the principle of intervention we should always be 
simultaneously engaged in some forty wars!’ 
Of course, it is an exaggeration to suggest that the strategy of preponderance 
will involve the United States in forty wars simultaneously. It is not, however, 
an exaggeration to note that the need to defend America’s perceived interest 
in maintaining a security framework in which economic interdependence can 
flourish has become the primary rationale for expanding its security commit- 
ments in East Asia and in Europe. To preserve a security framework favorable 
to interdependence, the United States does not, in fact, intervene everywhere; 
however, the logic underlying the strategy of preponderance can be used to 
justify U.S. intervention anywhere. 
Threat Inflation, Credibility, and Interdependence 
The security/interdependence nexus results in the exaggeration of threats to 
American strategic interests because it requires the United States to defend its 
core interests by intervening in the peripheries. There are three reasons for this. 
First, as Johnson points out, order-maintenance strategies are biased inherently 
toward threat exaggeration. Threats to order generate an anxiety ”that has at 
its center the fear of the unknown. It is not just security, but the pattern of 
order upon which the sense of security depends that is threatened.”41 Second, 
because the strategy of preponderance requires U.S. intervention in places that 
concededly have no intrinsic strategic value, U.S. policymakers are compelled 
to overstate the dangers to American interests to mobilize domestic support 
for their p~licies.~’ Third, the tendency to exaggerate threats is tightly linked 
to the strategy of preponderance’s concern with maintaining U.S. credibility. 
The diplomatic historian Robert J. McMahon has observed that since 1945 
U.S. policymakers consistently have asserted that American credibility is 
”among the most critical of all foreign policy  objective^."^^ As Khalilzad makes 
clear, they still are obsessed with the need to preserve America’s reputation for 
honoring its security commitments: ”The credibility of U.S. alliances can be 
40. Quoted in Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background lnfluences on British External 
Policy, 1865-1980 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 105. 
41. Johnson, Improbable Dangers, p. 12. 
42. Ibid., pp. 131-132; Jervis in Dominoes and Bandwagons; and John A. Thompson ”The Exaggera- 
tion of American Vulnerability: The Anatomy of a Tradition,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 16, No. 1 
(Winter 1992), pp. 23-43. 
43. Robert J. McMahon, ”Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in 
Postwar American Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Fall 1991), p. 455. 
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undermined if key allies, such as Germany and Japan, believe that the current 
arrangements do not deal adequately with threats to their security. It could 
also be undermined if, over an extended period, the United States is perceived 
as lacking the will or capability to lead in protecting their interests."@ Credi- 
bility is believed to be crucial if the extended deterrence guarantees on which 
the strategy of preponderance rests are to remain robust. 
Preponderance's concern with credibility leads to the belief that U.S. com- 
mitments are interdependent. As Thomas C. Schelling has put it: "Few parts 
of the world are intrinsically worth the risk of serious war by themselves . . . 
but defending them or running risks to protect them may preserve one's 
commitments to action in other parts of the world at later times."45 If others 
perceive that the United States has acted irresolutely in a specific crisis, they 
will conclude that it will not honor its commitments in future crises. Hence, 
as happened repeatedly in the Cold War, the United States has taken military 
action in peripheral areas to demonstrate-both to allies and potential adver- 
saries-that it will uphold its security obligations in core areas. 
Interdependence and Extended Deterrence in the Twenty-first 
Century 
Views about US. grand strategy are linked inextricably to attitudes about 
nuclear proliferation and deterrence. In their recent debate Scott Sagan and 
Kenneth Waltz crystallized the percolating argument between "deterrence 
optimists" and "proliferation  pessimist^."^^ The strategy of preponderance 
reflects "proliferation pessimism," the belief that the spread of nuclear weap- 
ons will have negative consequences: specifically, renationalization and an 
increased risk of nuclear conflict. The strategy rests on the assumption that the 
United States can prevent these consequences by bringing potential prolifera- 
tors within the shelter of its security umbrella. Thus the strategy is based not 
only on proliferation pessimism but on extended deterrence optimism: a belief 
(or faith) in the continuing robustness of the U.S. security umbrella. 
Extended deterrence optimism is quite problematic, however. As Bradley A. 
Thayer points out, states that obtain nuclear weapons are driven to do so by 
44. Khalilzad, "US. Grand Strategies," p. 24. 
45. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), 
p. 124. 
46. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1995). This terminology is borrowed from Peter Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences 
of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 695-753. 
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security imperatives. Proliferation is a demand-driven problem: ”If states feel 
that nuclear weapons are not needed for their security, then they will not seek 
to acquire them.”47 The strategy of preponderance attempts to solve this 
demand-driven cause of proliferation by assuaging the protected states’ secu- 
rity fears. Whether the strategy can work is a function of two interrelated 
factors. First, is extended deterrence credible? That is, will it actually dissuade 
an adversary from attacking the target state? Second, will U.S. guarantees 
reassure the protected state? 
Why Extended Deterrence Will Fail in the Post-Cold War World 
In its current iteration, the strategy of preponderance is a reprise of America’s 
Cold War extended deterrence strategy. Extended deterrence is a difficult 
strategy to implement successfully: ”One of the perpetual problems of deter- 
rence on behalf of third parties is that the costs a state is willing to bear are 
usually much less than if its own territory is at stake, and it is very difficult to 
pretend ~ the rwise . ”~~  For extended deterrence to work, a potential challenger 
must be convinced that the defender’s commitment is ~redible.4~ 
During the Cold War, extending deterrence to Western Europe was thought 
to be especially problematic after the Soviet Union attained strategic nuclear 
parity with the United States because, in the course of defending Europe, the 
United States would have exposed itself to Soviet nuclear retaliation. Concern 
was expressed on both sides of the Atlantic that the U.S. pledge to use nuclear 
weapons to deter a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe was irra- 
tional and incredible (in both senses of the latter term). Indeed, extended 
deterrence was a contentious issue that seriously corroded NATO’s unity. 
During the Cold War, many U.S. strategists suggested that to solve the ”credi- 
bility of commitment” problem, the United States needed to acquire strategic 
damage limitation capabilities (counterforce, ballistic missile defenses) and 
firmly establish its reputation for upholding its commitments (by defending 
47. Bradley A. Thayer, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Regime,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), p. 503. 
48. Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983), p. 86. 
49. Thomas C. Schelling has explained why extended deterrence raises such important concerns 
about credibility: ”To fight abroad is a military act, but to persuade enemies or allies that would 
fight abroad, under circumstances of great cost and risk, requires more than a military capability. 
It requires projecting intentions. It requires having those intentions, even deliberately acquiring 
them, and communicating them persuasively to make other countries behave,” Schelling, Arms 
and Influence, p. 36 (emphasis in original). 
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intrinsically unimportant areas in the periphery, deliberately circumscribing its 
ability to back away from commitments, and demonstrating that it could act 
”irrationally”) .50 
Despite its perceived complexities, it appears that extended deterrence 
”worked” in Europe during the Cold War and was easier to execute success- 
fully than generally was tho~ght .~’  One should not assume, however, that 
extended deterrence will work similarly well in the early twenty-first century, 
because the unique coincidence of contextual variables is unlikely to be repli- 
cated in the future; they include: bipolarity; a clearly defined, and accepted, 
geopolitical status quo; the intrinsic value to the defender of the protected 
region; and the permanent forward deployment by the defender of sizeable 
military forces in the protected region. 
The international system’s polarity affects extended deterrence’s efficacy. 
During the Cold War, the bipolar nature of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe 
stabilized the superpower relationship by demarcating the continent into U.S. 
and Soviet spheres of influence that delineated the vital interests of both 
s~pe rpowers .~~  Each knew it courted disaster if it challenged the other’s sphere. 
Also, the superpowers were able to exercise control over their major allies to 
minimize the risk of being chain-ganged into a conflict.53 In the early twenty- 
first century, however, the international system will be multipolar and, argu- 
50. See Colin S. Gray, ”Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory,” International Security, 
Vol. 4, No. 1 (Summer 1979), pp. 54437; Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, ”Victory Is Possible,” Foreign 
Policy, No. 39 (Summer 1980), pp. 14-27; and Earl Ravenal, ”Alliance and Counterforce,” Interna- 
tional Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 26-43, Unlike Gray and Payne, Ravenal concluded 
that it was impossible for the United States to attain the strategic prerequisites for credible 
extended deterrence. For the argument that extended deterrence is credible even under the 
condition of mutual assured destruction, see Robert Jervis, Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear 
Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). On the “rationality of the irrational,” see 
Stephen Maxwell, Rationality in Deterrence, Adelphi Paper No. 50 (London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1968). 
51. Deterrence ”success” often poses a non-barking dog problem-the difficulty of explaining why 
an event did not happen. What appears to be a successful instance of deterrence may, in fact, be 
attributable to other factors. For instance, the putative attacker may not, in fact, have intended to 
forcibly challenge the defender’s deterrence commitment. See Morgan, Deterrence, p. 25. 
52. See Kenneth N. Waltz, ”The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 
1964), pp. 881-909, and Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future.” For the argument that the international 
system’s stability during the Cold War era was attributable to nuclear deterrence and that bipo- 
larity was an irrelevant factor, see Ted Hopf, ”Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 3 (June 1991), pp. 475-494. 
53. On ”chain-ganging,” see Jack Snyder and Thomas J. Christensen, ”Chain Gangs and Passed 
Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 
(Spring 1990), pp. 137-168. 
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ably, less stable and more conflict prone than a bipolar international ~ystem.5~ 
Spheres of influence will not be delineated clearly. In addition, because other 
states will have more latitude to pursue their own foreign and security policy 
agendas than they did during the Cold War, the risk will be much greater that 
the United States could be chain-ganged into a conflict because of a protected 
state’s irresponsible behavior. 
Extended deterrence is bolstered by a clearly delineated geopolitical status 
quo and undermined by the absence of clearly defined spheres of influence. 
The resolution of the 194849 Berlin crisis formalized Europe’s de facto postwar 
partition. After 1949 the very existence of a clear status quo in Europe itself 
bolstered deterrence. As Robert Jervis points out, in geopolitical rivalries the 
defender enjoys two advantages: the potential attacker must bear the onus (and 
risk) of moving first, and the defender’s interests generally outweigh the 
challenger’s (hence the defender is usually willing to run greater risks to 
defend the status quo than the challenger is to change it).55 In the post-Cold 
War world, however, the number of political and territorial flashpoints where 
the status quo is hotly contested is on the rise, including: the Senkaku 
the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, Tokdo/Takeshima, and a host of potential disputes 
in East Central and Eastern Europe. One could argue of course that the United 
States would not have to deter these potential conflicts because they are 
peripheral to its security interests. This, however, overlooks the fact that U.S. 
policymakers believe the strategy of preponderance requires the United States 
to stand firm in the peripheries. For example, many of the strategy’s propo- 
nents believe that to prevent European renationalization and preserve its 
credibility, the United States could not remain indifferent to Russian aggression 
against the Baltics or Ukraine (notwithstanding that current policy would 
exclude these states from the security sphere of even an expanded NATO). 
54. For the argument that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones, see Waltz, ”The 
Stability of a Bipolar World”; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 161-176; and Mearsheimer, 
”Back to the Future.” For the counterargument, see Stephen Van Evera, ”Primed for Peace: Europe 
After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57. 
55. Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Peace (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 30-31. Also see Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 44. 
56. China‘s claims to the islands have been supported by Taiwan and Hong Kong. Concerned that 
China may forcibly seize the islands, Tokyo has indicated that it might use Japan’s naval forces to 
resist. The Japanese government believes the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty obligates the 
United States to defend the Senkakaus. See Nicholas D. Kristof, ”Would You Fight for These 
Islands?” New York Times, October 20,1996, p. E3, and Nicholas D. Kristof, ”A Mini Asian Tempest 
Over Mini Island Group,” New York Times, September 16, 1996, p. A7. 
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Indeed, some evidence suggests that the United States is contemplating further 
NATO expansion into the per ipher ie~ .~~ 
A crucial factor in weighing the credibility of a defender's extended deter- 
rence commitments is the extent of its interest in the protected area.58 Had the 
Soviets contemplated seriously an attack on Western Europe, the risk calculus 
probably would have dissuaded them. In a bipolar setting Western Europe's 
security was a matter of supreme importance to the United States for both 
strategic and reputational reasons. In the early twenty-first century, however, 
the intrinsic value of many of the regions where the United States may wish 
to extend deterrence will be doubtful. Indeed, in the post-Cold War world 
"few imaginable disputes will engage vital U.S.  interest^."^^ It thus will be 
difficult to convince a potential attacker that U.S. deterrence commitments are 
credible. Moreover, the attenuated nature of U.S. interests will result in moti- 
vational asymmetries favoring potential challengers. That is, the "balance of 
resolve" will lie with the challenger, not with the United States, because the 
challenger will have more at stake.60 
It is doubtful that the United States could deter a Russian invasion of the 
Baltics or Ukraine, or, several decades hence, a Chinese assault on Taiwan. To 
engage in such actions, Moscow or Beijing would have to be highly motivated; 
conversely, the objects of possible attack are unimportant strategically to the 
57. See Steven Erlanger, "US. Pushes Bigger NATO Despite Qualms on Russia," New York Times, 
October 10, 1996, p. A4. 
58. Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 1988), p. 43. 
59. Robert Jervis, "What Do We Want to Deter and How Do We Deter It?" in L. Benjamin 
Ederington and Michael J. Mazar, eds., Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy 
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), p. 130. 
60. Nuclear deterrence is effective when the defender's own survival is at stake but much less so 
in other situations. In the case of "limited" or "specific" challenges, the outcome is "determined 
by the parties' relative determination regarding the issue in dispute." Shai Feldman, "Middle East 
Nuclear Stability: The State of the Region and the State of the Debate," journal of International 
Afairs, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 215. Also see T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation 
by Weaker Powers (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Recently, some scholars 
have employed "prospect theory" to explain why a state could be motivated to choose war even 
though victory is doubtful. See John Arquilla and Paul K. Davis, Extended Deterrence, Compellence 
and the "Old World Order" (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1992); Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla, 
Thinking About Opponent Behavior in Crisis and Conflict: A Generic Model for Analysis and Group 
Discussion, N-3322-JS (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1991); and Barbara Farnham, ed., Avoiding 
LoseslTaking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1995). For a balanced assessment prospect theory as applied to international relations, see 
Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical 
Problems," Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1992), pp. 283-310. 
International Security 22:l I 108 
United States, which would cause the challenger to discount U.S. credibility. 
The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan suggests the difficulties that 
U.S. extended deterrence strategy will face in coming decades. (China pro- 
voked the crisis by conducting intimidating military exercises in an attempt to 
influence Taiwan’s presidential elections.) During the crisis a Chinese official 
said that China could use force against Taiwan without fear of U.S. intervention 
because American decision makers “care more about Los Angeles than they 
do about Taiwan.”61 Although an empty threat today, as China becomes more 
powerful militarily and economically in coming decades, threats of this nature 
from Beijing will be more potent. 
Deterrence theory holds that extended deterrence is strengthened when the 
guarantor deploys its own military forces on the protected state’s territory. 
Thus during the Cold War, the presence of large numbers of U.S. combat forces 
and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe underscored its importance to the 
United States and bolstered extended deterrence’s credibility. The defender’s 
deployment of forces is one of the most powerful factors in ensuring extended 
deterrence success, because it is a visible signal that the defender ”means 
business.”62 In contrast, in the early twenty-first century in many places where 
the United States may seek to implement extended deterrence, the strategy’s 
effectiveness will be undercut because the United States will not have a per- 
manent, sizeable military presence in the target state (Korea is a notable 
exception). 
For example, it is unlikely that the United States would ever bolster the 
credibility of security guarantees (should they, in fact, be given) to states like 
Ukraine, the Baltics, or even Taiwan-each of which is threatened potentially 
by a nuclear rival-by deploying ground forces as tokens of its resolve. Indeed, 
assuming NATO expansion goes forward, Washington has taken an ambiva- 
lent stance with respect to whether the United States will deploy troops or 
tactical nuclear weapons or both in Poland (which, because of its proximity to 
Russia, would be an expanded NATO’s most vulnerable member state). At 
currently projected force levels, moreover, the American presence in Europe 
61. Quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, “As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure US. Listens,” Nau York 
Times, January 24,1996, p. A3. I stress that this analysis is prospective. Today, China lacks the military 
capabilities to invade Taiwan successfully; however, the balance of forces probably will shift 
decisively in China’s favor in the next decade or two, and the deterrent effect of any American 
commitment to Taiwan would be vitiated. Conventional deterrence no longer would be robust and 
any U.S. intervention would carry with it the risk of escalation to nuclear war. 
62. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, p. 254, and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About 
the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York Random House, 1988), p. 599. 
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and East Asia probably will be too small to make extended deterrence credible 
in the early twenty-first century; a challenger, with good reason, may question 
whether the United States has either the capability or the intent to honor its 
deterrent commitments. U.S. forward-deployed forces could constitute the 
worst kind of trip wire-one that invites challenges rather than deterring them. 
The United States of course could attempt to enhance the robustness of 
extended deterrence by increasing the size of its conventional deployments in 
key regions; however, it is doubtful that this would be either feasible or 
effective. Significantly increasing the number of U.S. forward-deployed forces 
in Europe and East Asia would be e ~ p e n s i v e . ~ ~  And even then, the effect on 
the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees would be uncertain. 
After all, during the Cold War even the presence of over 300,000 U.S. troops 
in Europe was insufficient to reassure policymakers in the United States and 
Western Europe that extended deterrence was robust. 
Economic Interdependence and Declining Relative Power 
The strategy of preponderance incorporates contradictory assumptions about 
the importance of relative power. On the one hand, the strategy seeks to 
maximize America’s military power by perpetuating its role as the predomi- 
nant great power in the international system. Yet the strategy’s economic 
dimension is curiously indifferent to the security implications of the redistri- 
bution of relative power in the international political system resulting from 
economic interdependence. Nor does it resolve the following conundrum: 
given that economic power is the foundation of military strength, how will the 
United States be able to retain its hegemonic position in the international 
political system if its relative economic power continues to decline? 
Contrary to the strategy of preponderance, the security/interdependence 
nexus posits that economic openness has adverse strategic consequences: it 
contributes to, and accelerates, a redistribution of relative power among states 
in the international system (allowing rising competitors to catch up to the 
United States more quickly than they otherwise would). This leads to the 
emergence of new great powers. The resulting power transition, which occurs 
63. Indeed, America’s ability to sustain even its current level of forward-deployed forces is 
uncertain. It has been reported that because of fiscal constraints, the Pentagon is considering 
reducing U.S. forces in the Pacific below the heretofore sacrosanct deployment of 100,000 U.S. 
personnel. Paul Richter, ”US. Pacific Troop Strength May Be Cut, Admiral Says,” Los Angeles Times, 
February 4, 1997, p. A14. 
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as a formerly dominant power declines and new challengers arise, usually 
climaxes in great power war.@ Because great power emergence is driven by 
uneven growth rates, there is little-short of preventive war-that the United 
States can do to prevent the rise of new great powers. But, to some extent, U.S. 
grand strategy can affect both the pace and the magnitude of America’s relative 
power decline. 
A crucial relationship exists between America’s relative power and its stra- 
tegic commitments. Paul Kennedy and Robert Gilpin explain how strategic 
overcommitment leads first to ”imperial overstretch” and then to relative 
decline.65 Ultimately, the decline in its relative power leaves a waning hegemon 
less well placed to fend off challenges to its systemwide strategic interests. 
Preponderance’s key strategic commitments were undertaken in the late 1940s, 
when the United States was near the zenith of its relative power. Yet, during 
the 1980s and 1990s, although its relative economic power has declined, U.S. 
commitments have continued to expand. It is not inappropriate to infer that 
the attempt to sustain expanding commitments on a shrinking relative power 
base is harmful to America’s economic performance. 
Is the strategy of preponderance directly responsible for America’s relative 
economic decline (or for making it worse than it otherwise might have been)? 
This is a complex question. Defense spending does not invariably lead to 
economic decline; indeed, under certain conditions it can stimulate economic 
growth.66 It could be argued in fact that America’s sustained postwar economic 
growth would have been impossible without “military Keyne~ianism.”~~ Nev- 
ertheless, the cumulative effect of the high levels of national security-related 
spending required to support preponderance is that the United States is less 
well off economically than it otherwise would have been. 
64. This might be called the “hegemonic instability theory.” See A.EK Organski, World Politics, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968); A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: Univer- 
sity of Chicago Press, 1980); and Robert Gilpin, “Theory of Hegemonic War,” in Robert I. Rotberg 
and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). pp. 1537. 
65. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 
to 2000 (New York Random House, 1987), and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
66. On this issue, see Charles A. Kupchan, ”Empire, Military Power, and Economic Decline,” 
International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 36-53. 
67. For a critique of military Keynesianism, see Seymour Melman, The Permanent War Economy: 
American Capitalism in Decline (New York Simon and Schuster, 1974). For an implicit defense of 
military Keynesianism, see Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy 
(New York: Free Press, 1997). 
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Gilpin has outlined the causal logic supporting this conclusion. As he points 
out, the overhead costs of empire are high: “In order to maintain its dominant 
position, a state must expend its resources on military forces, the financing of 
allies, foreign aid, and the costs associated with maintaining the international 
economy. These protection and related costs are not productive investments; 
they constitute an economic drain on the economy of the dominant state.”68 
Although not conclusive, some evidence suggests that, directly and indirectly, 
the strategy of preponderance has contributed significantly to the relative 
decline of U.S. economic power. David Calleo has shown that the inflationary 
spiral ignited by the Vietnam War, coupled with the dollar outflows required 
to sustain America’s preeminent military and economic position, were factors 
in undermining U.S. economic competitiveness and relative economic power 
(reflected in the chronic balance-of-payments and trade deficits the United 
States has incurred since 1971).69 The high levels of defense spending the 
strategy requires also have significant opportunity costs, and affect long-term 
economic performance by diverting scarce resources from the civilian econ- 
 my.^' Even though it constitutes a relatively small share of U.S. GNP, the 
adverse economic impact of defense spending, as the economist Lloyd L. 
Dumas observes, can ”be dramatically out of proportion to its relative size” 
because it diverts from productive uses “substantial amounts of critical eco- 
nomic reso~rces.’’~~ 
It is difficult to quantify the strategy of preponderance’s economic costs; Jim 
Hanson’s 1993 analysis suggests, however, that the strategy’s costs include: loss 
of domestic savings, trade deficits, overseas investment and loan losses, em- 
ployment loss and welfare costs (attributable to the export of jobs), a swelling 
federal budget deficit, ballooning interest on the federal debt, foreign economic 
and military aid, and one-half of U.S. defense spending (attributable to “im- 
perial” security responsibilities).” According to Hanson’s study, as of 1990 the 
68. Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 156157. 
69. David Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
70. On the opportunity cost and resource diversion arguments, see Robert W. DeGrasse, Military 
Expansion, Economic Decline: The Impact of Military Spending on U.S. Economic Performance (Armonk, 
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe 1983); Lloyd J. Dumas, The Overburdened Economy: Uncovering the Causes of 
Chronic Unemployment, Inflation, and National Decline (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); 
Robert Kuttner, End of Laissez Faire: National Purpose and the Global Economy After the Cold War (New 
York Random House, 1991); Seymour Melman, The Permanent War Economy; and Seymour Melman 
”The Limits of Military Power: Economic and Other,” International Security, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 
1986), pp. 72-87. 
71. Dumas, Overburdened Economy, p. 208. 
72. Jim Hanson, The Decline of the American Empire (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993). 
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cost of maintaining the American empire was $970 trillion, nearly 20 percent 
of GNP. Although the specifics of the study’s accounting methodology can be 
questioned, the basic point remains: There is a strong prima facie case that for 
the United States the strategy of preponderance is expensive, and over the long 
term the strategy will retard its economic performance; decrease its relative 
economic power; and weaken its geopolitical standing in the emerging twenty- 
first century-multipolar system. 
Offshore Balancing: An Alternative Grand Strategy 
An alternative to the strategy of preponderance is offshore balancing. In this 
section I describe a U.S. grand strategy of offshore balancing, delineate the 
realist premises on which the strategy rests, and demonstrate how the strategy 
is deduced from these premises. 
Offshore balancing is a strategy for the multipolar world that already is 
emerging. Its underlying premise is that it will become increasingly more 
difficult, dangerous, and costly for the United States to maintain order in, and 
control over, the international political system as called for by the strategy of 
preponderance. Offshore balancing would define U.S. interests narrowly in 
terms of defending the United States’ territorial integrity and preventing the 
rise of a Eurasian hegemon. As an offshore balancer, the United States would 
disengage from its military commitments in Europe, Japan, and South Korea. 
The overriding objectives of an offshore balancing strategy would be to insu- 
late the United States from future great power wars and maximize its relative 
power position in the international system. Offshore balancing would reject 
the strategy of preponderance’s commitment to economic interdependence 
because interdependence has negative strategic consequences. Offshore balanc- 
ing also would eschew any ambition of perpetuating U.S. hegemony and 
would abandon the ideological pretensions embedded in the strategy of pre- 
ponderance. As an offshore balancer, the United States would not assertively 
export democracy, engage directly in peace enforcement operations, attempt 
to save ”failed states” (like Somalia and Haiti), or use military power for the 
purpose of humanitarian intervention. 
An offshore balancing strategy would be considerably less expensive than 
the strategy of preponderance. It would require defense budgets in the range 
of 2-2.5 percent of GNP. American military strategy for possible interventions 
would be based on the principle of limited liability. In contrast to the force 
structure currently underpinning the strategy of preponderance, offshore bal- 
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ancing would sharply reduce the size and role of U.S. ground forces. The 
strategy’s backbone would be robust nuclear deterrence, air power, and-most 
important-overwhelming naval power. In the latter respect, an offshore bal- 
ancing strategy would stress sea-based ballistic missile defense (crucial in the 
event the United States has to wage coalitional warfare in the early twenty-first 
century) and sea-based precision, standoff weapons systems (enabling the 
United States to bring its military power to bear without committing ground 
forces to combat). The United States also could use naval power as a lever 
against others’ economic interests to achieve its political objectives. As an 
offshore balancer, the United States would seek simultaneously to maximize 
its comparative military-technological advantages and its strategic flexibility. 
Theoretical Assumptions 
Offshore balancing is a grand strategy deduced from realist international 
relations theory. Specifically, the strategy is based on the following assump- 
tions: balance-of-power strategies are superior to hegemonic ones; for a great 
power like the United States, interdependence is an illusion, not a reality; the 
robustness of US. extended deterrence commitments will be significantly de- 
graded in coming years; U.S. strategy need not be burdened by excessive 
concern with credibility, resolve, and reputation; geography has important 
grand strategic implications; the risk of a rival Eurasian hegemon emerging is 
small; U.S. grand strategy can confidently assume that other states would 
balance against a potential hegemon; the dynamics of alliance relationships 
favor an offshore balancing strategy; and relative power concerns remain the 
bedrock of a prudent grand strategy. 
Offshore balancing is a balance-of-power strategy, not a hegemonic one. It 
assumes that the United States would be more secure in a multipolar system 
than it would be by attempting to perpetuate its current preeminence. It is, up 
to a point, an offensive realist strategy. Unlike the offensive realist variant of 
the strategy of preponderance, however, this strategy would be predicated on 
the assumption that attempting to maintain U.S. hegemony is self-defeating 
because it will provoke other states to balance against the United States, and 
result in the depletion of America’s relative power-thereby leaving it worse 
off than it would have been by accommodating multipolarity. An offshore 
balancing strategy also would reject the balance-of-threat argument advanced 
by preponderance’s defensive realist proponents: it is the very fact of the 
hegemon’s unbalanced power that threatens others (and spurs the emergence 
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of new great powers). An offshore balancing strategy would accept that the 
United States cannot prevent the rise of new great powers either within or 
outside its sphere of influence.” 
It is logically inconsistent for preponderance’s proponents to claim simulta- 
neously that the United States is preeminent and that it is interdependent. In 
fact, unlike states with smaller economies, very large and powerful states have 
relatively little interaction with the international economy.74 Offshore balanc- 
ing would recognize that the United States, in fact, is not economically inter- 
dependent with the international economy. The United States is well placed to 
adopt an insular grand strategy because it can diversify its export markets; it 
can minimize its reliance on overseas raw materials (including petroleum) by 
stockpiling, diversification, and substitution; and external trade is a relatively 
small component of its gross domestic product (GDP). Merchandise exports 
account for only about 6 percent of U.S. GDP (the average for industrialized 
states is about 24 percent).75 To be sure, such aggregate figures may fail to 
capture the true extent of economic interdependence (because a large part of 
international trade now is attributable to cross-national trade within individual 
firms). Hence it could be claimed that turmoil in the international system 
would have a greater impact on U.S. prosperity than the above figure suggests. 
This argument should not be dismissed; however, if the United States adopts 
an offshore balancing strategy, markets would adjust to a changing political 
and strategic context, and over time investment and trade flows would be 
altered. More geopolitically secure regions-especially the United States- 
would be the beneficiaries of these alterations. 
An offshore balancing strategy would recognize explicitly that the credibility 
of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees will be vitiated in coming years. The 
United States would be more secure if it withdraws its deterrent umbrella and 
allows other states to defend themselves. As an offshore balancer, the United 
States would accept that some (preferably managed) nuclear proliferation is 
inevitable. Extended deterrence’s eroding credibility is an important reason 
why US. hegemony will be unsustainable in the twenty-first century. As 
73. The arguments made in this paragraph are elaborated on in Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion.” 
74. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 145-146. On the dependence of small states on the 
international economy, see Peter Katzenstein, Small States and World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1985). 
75. Helen V. Milner and Robert 0. Keohane, ”Internationalization and Domestic Politics: An 
Introduction,” in Helen V. Milner and Robert 0. Keohane, eds., Internationalization and Domestic 
Politics (New York Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 12-13. 
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potential great powers come to doubt the reliability of the U.S. security um- 
brella (which will occur even if the United States sticks with the strategy of 
preponderance), they inevitably will seek strategic self-sufficiency (including 
nuclear weapons). It is unlikely, however, that an offshore balancing strategy 
would touch off a proliferation chain reaction. Middle and small powers, given 
their limited resources, might well decide that they would be more secure by 
enhancing their conventional forces than by acquiring nuclear weapons.76 
Offshore balancing is not an extended deterrence strategy. Hence if it adopts 
this strategy, the United States would not need to be overly preoccupied with 
reputational concerns. Indeed, in this respect, the strategy of preponderance is 
based on incorrect premises about reputation. Jonathan Mercer has shown, for 
example, that whether a state stands firm in a crisis seldom affects its reputa- 
tion for resoluteness with others (either adversaries or rivals) because others 
rarely predict the state’s future behavior from that crisis’s outcome.77 That is, 
others’ perceptions of a defender’s resolve are context specific: resolve is a 
function of the magnitude of the defender’s interests in a particular situation, 
not by its behavior in previous crises. Using recent empirical research, offshore 
balancing proponents reject the notion that America must fight in the periph- 
eries to establish its commitment to defend its core  interest^.^^ The strategy 
would be based on the belief that concrete vital interests should determine U.S. 
commitments (rather than credibiIity determining commitments and commit- 
ments, in turn, determining  interest^).^^ When America’s intrinsic stakes in a 
specific crisis are high (and its capabilities robust), neither adversaries nor 
others will question its resolve. Conversely, when the United States fails to 
intervene in peripheral areas, others will not draw adverse inferences about 
its willingness to defend vital, core interests. 
The strategy of preponderance assumes that multipolar systems are unsta- 
ble. As a generalization this may be true, but instability does not affect all states 
equally. Preponderance’s advocates fail to consider geography’s differential 
76. See Steven E. Miller, ”Fateful Choices: Nuclear Weapons, Ukrainian Security, and International 
Stability,” in Scott D. Sagan, ed., Civil-Milita y Relations and Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 139-163. 
77. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1996). 
78. During the Cold War the Soviet Union did not conclude that American defeats in the periphery 
undermined the credibility of U.S. commitments to areas of high intrinsic strategic value. See Ted 
Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence T h e o y  and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
79. This formulation is borrowed from Johnson, Improbable Dangers, p. 144. 
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effects. An offshore balancing strategy, however, would account explicitly for 
geography’s impact on grand strategy. Insular great powers are substantially 
less likely to be affected by instability than are states that face geographically 
proximate rivals. Hence the United States could effectively insulate itself from 
the future great power wars likely to be caused by power transition effects. 
Because of the interlocking effects of geography, nuclear weapons (which 
enhance insularity’s strategic advantages), and formidable military and eco- 
nomic capabilities, the United States is virtually impregnable against direct 
attack. The risk of conflict, and the possible exposure of the American home- 
land to attack, derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by 
preponderance’s expansive definition of U.S. interests. 
In multipolar systems, insular great powers have a much broader range of 
strategic choices than less fortunately placed powers. Because their strategic 
interdependence with others is low, they can avoid being entrapped by alliance 
commitments and need worry little about being abandoned by actual or 
potential allies.80 Offshore great powers also have the choice of staying out of 
great power wars altogether or of limiting their involvement-a choice un- 
available to states that live in dangerous neighborhoods in which rivals lurk 
nearby. As an insular great power in a multipolar world, the United States 
would retain a free hand strategically: although it might need to enter into 
temporary coalitions, the United States would disengage from permanent 
alliance relationships. Because of its insularity and capabilities, the United 
States would seldom need to engage in external balancing. Internal balancing 
is always preferable to external balancing because alliance commitments are 
constraining strategically.8’ An insular great power like the United States 
seldom needs to subject itself to strategic constraints of this kind. 
In the early-twenty-first-century multipolar system the risk that a Eurasian 
hegemon will emerge is slight. Even if a Eurasian hegemon were to appear, 
America’s core security probably would be unthreatened. The fear that a future 
Eurasian hegemon would command sufficient resources to imperil the United 
80. On entrapment, see Glenn H. Snyder, ”The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World 
Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 466468. For historical studies supporting the argument that 
insular great powers can afford to take a relaxed attitude about their allies’ fates without endan- 
gering their own security, see Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Seapower: The Strategic Advantage of 
Navies in War (New York: Free Press, 1992), and Daniel A. Baugh, ”British Strategy During the 
First World War in the Context of Four Centuries: Blue-Water versus Continental Commitment,” 
in Daniel M. Masterson, ed., Naval History: The Sixth Symposium of the U.S. Naval Academy (Wil- 
mington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1987). 
81. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 165-168. 
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States is a strategic artifact of the prenuclear era.82 A good strategy, however, 
hedges against unknown (and unknowable) future contingencies. Hence an 
offshore balancing strategy would not rule out the possibility that, as the 
balancer of last resort, the United States might need to intervene to thwart the 
emergence of a hegemonic challenger. Three reasons explain why the possibil- 
ity of intervention cannot be foreclosed completely. First, the military-techno- 
logical backdrop to international politics may change in the future because of 
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Some analysts predict that the RMA 
will result in greatly enhanced conventional war-fighting capabilities. If so, 
deterrence could be weakened and the nuclear revolution (which bolsters 
insularity) could be partially offset. In that case, traditional concerns about the 
military effects of capability and resource distributions among states again 
could become salient. Second, a Eurasian hegemon might be able to use its 
power diplomatically to coerce the United States. Third, it might be too un- 
comfortable psychologically for the United States to live in a world dominated 
by another power. 
The strategy of preponderance is based in part on the assumption that the 
United States must prevent the rise of a hegemonic challenger because other 
states either will not or will not do so effe~tively.8~ In contrast, an offshore 
balancing strategy would be based on the assumptions that in a multipolar 
world other states will balance against potential hegemons, and it is to Amer- 
ica’s advantage to shift this responsibility to others. In a multipolar world the 
United States could be confident that effective balancing ultimately would 
occur because to ensure their survival, other states have the incentive to 
balance against geographically proximate rivals, and great powers do not 
bandwagon.M Because of its insularity, the United States can stand aloof from 
others’ security competitions and engage in ”bystanding” and “buck-passing” 
behavior, thereby forcing others to assume the risks and costs of antihegemonic 
82. See Robert W. Tucker, The New Isolationism: Threat or Promise? (New York Universe Books, 
1972), pp. 40-51. 
83. See Khalilzad, “U.S. Grand Strategies,” p. 22. 
84. Offshore balancing is similar to what Samuel I? Huntington calls “secondary” balancing. He 
is skeptical that America is suited to the role of a secondary balancer. Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 233. 
I disagree with Huntington’s argument because I do not believe that offshore balancing requires 
the United States to ”play off other great powers against each other, or to constantly shift its 
strategic alignment. Great powers balance against each other because structural constraints impel 
them to do so. In a nuclear multipolar world the United States would not need to engage in 
micromanagement of the geopolitical balance. Washington would only need to ensure against the 
unlikely failure of others to check the emergence of a rising potential hegemon. 
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balancinga5 When an offshore balancer shifts to others the dangers entailed by 
”going first,” it can reasonably hope that it may never have to become in- 
volved. 
The strategy of preponderance commits the United States to alliance rela- 
tionships that run counter to geostrategic logic: it imposes the greatest burden 
(in terms of danger and cost) on the alliance partner (the United States) whose 
security is least at risk. An offshore balancing strategy would reverse this 
pattern of alliance relations. There is no inherent reason that the United States 
should be compelled to bear the high costs of providing security for other 
states. Japan and Western Europe, for example, long have possessed the eco- 
nomic and technological capabilities to defend themselves. The strategy of 
preponderance, however (notwithstanding U.S. complaints about burden- 
sharing inequities), has actively discouraged them from doing so because 
American policymakers fear any diminution of U.S. control over the interna- 
tional system-including control over U.S. allies-would have adverse geopo- 
litical consequences. Washington has decided that it is preferable strategically 
for the United States to defend Germany and Japan rather than for Germany 
and Japan to defend themselves. In contrast, offshore balancing would rest on 
the assumption that America’s overall strategic position would be enhanced 
by devolving to others the responsibility for their own defense. 
An offshore balancing strategy would be grounded on the assumption that 
relative economic power matters. Domestic economic revitalization and a 
neomercantilist international economic policy would be integral components 
of the strategy. The strategy, however, also would seek to maximize U.S. 
relative power by capitalizing on its geostrategically privileged position. If the 
United States adopted an offshore balancing strategy, security competitions 
almost certainly would occur in East Asia and Europe.86 The United States 
would be the primary beneficiary of these rivalries between (among) the other 
great powers in the emerging multipolar system. Noninsular states’ constant 
worry about possible threats from nearby neighbors is a factor that historically 
has increased the relative power position of insular states.a7 Offshore balancing 
85. On the relationship between geography and buck-passing in multipolar systems, see Snyder 
and Christensen, ”Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks.” The arguments in favor of an offshore strategy 
were clearly articulated in the eighteenth century by the Tory proponents of an English “blue 
water” grand strategy. See Richard Pares, ”American versus Continental Warfare, 1739-63,” English 
Historical Review, Vol. 51, No. 203 (July 1936), pp. 43-37, 
86. For a precise definition of ”security competition,” see Art, ”Why Western Europe Still Needs 
the U.S. and NATO,” pp. 6-9. 
87. After 1815 Britain’s interests were not challenged by an overwhelming antihegemonic coalition 
because of ”the preoccupation of virtually all European statesman with continental power politics.” 
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thus would be a more sophisticated power-maximizing strategy than prepon- 
derance: the United States would be able to enhance its relative power without 
having to confront rivals directly. Great powers that stand on the sidelines 
while their peers engage in security competitions and conflict invariably gain 
in relative power.88 
Multipolarity challenges strategists because a state can be threatened by 
more than a single adversary. It is often unclear which of potential multiple 
rivals poses the most salient threat, whether measured in terms of capabilities, 
intentions, or time. In East Asia, where China and Japan are emerging great 
powers, the United States confronts this dilemma of multiple rivals. Offshore 
balancing is the classic grand strategic response of an insular great power 
facing two (or more) potential peer competitors in the same region. As an 
offshore balancer, the United States would increase its relative power against 
both China and Japan by letting them compete and balance against, and 
contain, each other.89 
Ofshore Balancing versus Preponderance: Defining the Debate 
Two critical objections could be lodged against an offshore balancing grand 
strategy: an offshore balancing strategy would increase-not lower-the risk 
of U.S. involvement in a major war, and the strategy of preponderance should 
not be abandoned because its benefits exceed its costs. Advocates of prepon- 
derance believe it is illusory to think that the United States can disengage from 
international commitments, because it inevitably would be drawn into major 
wars even if initially it tried to remain aloof. The example of Europe is 
frequently invoked: whenever a major European war breaks out, it is said, the 
United States invariably is compelled to intervene. Preponderance’s advocates 
also claim that U.S. security commitments in Europe and East Asia are a form 
It ”was the moves of their neighbors, not the usually discreet workings of British sea power, which 
interested them.” Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, rev. ed. (London: Ashfield 
Press, 1983), pp. 162-163. 
88. For example, the United States gained enormously in relative economic power and financial 
strength while standing on the sidelines during most of World War I. See Kathleen Burk, Britain, 
America, and the Sinezus of War, 2924-2928 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985). 
89. For a more detailed discussion of multipolarity’s implications for US. grand strategy in East 
Asia, see Christopher Layne, ”Less Is More: Minimal Realism in East Asia,” The National Interest, 
No. 43 (Spring 1996), pp. 64-77. For the argument that civilizational and cultural imperatives 
probably will cause Japan to bandwagon with China rather than balance against it, see Huntington, 
The Clash of Civilizations, pp. 236-238. Huntington and I disagree on the issue of whether civiliza- 
tional and cultural factors override the international system’s structural constraints on state 
behavior. 
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of insurance: it is cheaper and safer for the United States to retain its security 
commitments and thereby deter wars from happening than to stand on the 
sidelines only to be compelled to intervene later under what presumably 
would be more dangerous conditions. Yet this argument is unsupported by the 
historical record, and it is not evident that the strategy of preponderance will 
in fact minimize the risk of U.S. involvement in future wars. 
The argument that the United States invariably is drawn into major overseas 
conflicts is faulty. Since the United States achieved independence, great power 
wars have been waged in Europe in 1792-1802, 1804-15, 1853-55, 1859-60, 
1866,1870,1877-78,1912-13,1914-18, and 1939-45. The United States has been 
involved in three of these wars, but it safely could have remained out of at 
least two of the wars in which it fought. In 1812, hoping to conquer Canada 
while the British were preoccupied with the Napoleonic Wars, the United 
States initiated war with Britain. And as Robert E. Osgood has demonstrated, 
the United States’ intervention in World War I was not driven by any tangi- 
ble threat to its security interests.” The United States was not compelled 
to enter the Great War; it chose to do so, arguably with disastrous conse- 
quences. 
U.S. intervention in the Great War was driven by snowball/domino concerns 
similar to those embedded in today’s strategy of preponderance. Woodrow 
Wilson was perhaps the first U.S. policymaker to worry that toppling dominoes 
could endanger the United States.” He feared that events in seemingly periph- 
eral regions like the Balkans could trigger an uncontrollable chain reaction that 
would leave the United States isolated ideologically and confronting a hostile 
European hegemon that could use its military and economic power to ”cut off 
the oxygen without which American society, and liberal institutions generally, 
would a~phyxiate.”~’ 
An interesting counterfactual study awaits on what would have happened 
had the United States not intervened in 1917?3 The argument can be made 
that the war would have ended in a compromise peace. Peace, indeed, 
might have come before the revolutions that destroyed the German, Austro- 
90. Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation 
of the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). 
91. See Frank Ninkovich, Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth 
Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
92. Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
93. On the use of counterfactuals, see James D. Fearon, ”Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing 
in Political Science,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 169-195. 
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Hungarian, and Russian empires. A compromise peace might not have 
sown the seeds of social and economic unrest that facilitated Hitler’s rise to 
power. Had such a peace occurred, would a second great war have been 
waged in Europe? Possibly. But, if so, it would have been a much different 
war than World War 11; and it might have been a war the U.S. could have 
avoided. 
A related argument is that U.S. isolationism in the 1920s and 1930s had 
disastrous consequences and would have a similar effect in the future. Recent 
work by diplomatic historians, however, has debunked the notion that the 
United States followed an isolationist policy during the 1 9 3 0 ~ . ~ ~  Furthermore, 
the United States became involved in the Pacific War with Japan not because 
it followed an isolationist policy, but rather because it assertively defended its 
perceived East Asian interests (especially in China) from Japanese encroach- 
ment. It should also be noted that U.S. strategy toward Europe in 193941 was 
not isolationist, but rather a shrewd example of offshore balancing. In 193940 
the United States stood on the sidelines in the reasonable expectation that 
Britain and France could successfully hold Germany at bay. When France was 
defeated stunningly in the brief May-June 1940 campaign, the United States 
was able to continue following an offshore balancing strategy based on pro- 
viding military equipment and economic assistance to Britain and (after June 
1941) the Soviet Union, and fighting a limited liability naval war against 
German U-boats in the Atlantic. Had Germany not declared war on the United 
States, Washington might have persisted in that strategy indefinitely. In short, 
the historical record does not support the claim that European and Asian wars 
invariably compel the United States to intervene. Wars are not a force of nature 
that magnetically draws states into conflict. States-that is, policymakers- 
have volition: they decide whether to go to war. 
The insurance argument advanced by the strategy of preponderance’s advo- 
cates is also problematic. Great power war is rare because it is always an 
uncertain undertaking: war is to some extent its own deterrent. It is, however, 
94. Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America‘s Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 
2929-2933 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Michael J. Hogan, Informal 
Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 2928-2928 (Co- 
lumbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977); and Akirye Iryie, The Globalization of America 1923- 
2924, Vol. 13, in Warren I. Cohen, ed., Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Indeed, as the historian Walter A. McDougall observes, 
isolationism is simply ”a dirty word that interventionists, especially since Pearl Harbor, hurl at 
anyone who questions their policies.” Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The 
American Encounter with the World Since 2776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), p. 40. 
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an imperfect deterrent: great power wars do happen, and they will happen in 
the future. In a world where nuclear weapons exist the consequences of U.S. 
involvement could be enormous. The strategy of preponderance purports to 
insure the United States against the risk of war. If extended deterrence fails, 
however, the strategy actually ensures that America will be involved in war at 
its onset. As Californians know, there are some risks (earthquakes, for example) 
for which insurance is either prohibitively expensive or not available at any 
price because, although the probability of the event may be small, if it occurred 
the cost to the insurer would be catastrophic. Offshore balancing has the 
considerable advantage of giving the United States a high degree of strategic 
choice and, unlike the strategy of preponderance, a substantial measure of 
control over its fate. 
Preponderance’s advocates claim that from 1945 to 1990 the strategy was 
highly successful: the Soviet Union was defeated; Germany and Japan were 
transformed into democratic allies; and the open international trading system 
brought unprecedented prosperity to the United States and its allies. Although 
the strategy’s economic costs were not inconsiderable, it could be argued that 
these gains were more than worth the price America paid to secure them. 
Nevertheless, the United States did not emerge from the Cold War unscathed. 
The litany of costs is familiar: ballooning trade and budget deficits; stagnant 
real incomes; and social decay (reflected in crime rates, drug use, pornography, 
illegitimate births, and illegal immigration). 
I do not claim that the United States cannot ”afford” the strategy of prepon- 
derance; the strategy is the sole cause of its domestic economic and social 
problems; or cutting defense spending alone will solve these problems. Nev- 
ertheless, the strategy’s cumulative costs may be very high over the long term, 
and the United States is not compelled to pay these costs. The United States 
spends more on defense than it needs to spend (and thus less for domestic 
purposes) because of the manner in which the strategy conceives of U.S. 
security. Both proponents and critics of the strategy of preponderance must 
address the question of whether the strategy’s net benefits outweigh its costs. 
At this point, neither the critics nor proponents of the strategy have proven 
their case. The critics have, however, come forward with both a causal expla- 
nation and sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that indeed their case can 
be made. 
The American security studies community needs to take a close look at the 
cost-benefit trade-offs of the strategy of preponderance and alternative grand 
strategies. It is not enough for preponderance’s proponents simply to assert 
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that the ”American empire is a profitable venture.”95 Given that East Asia and 
Europe are likely to be geopolitically volatile regions in the early twenty-first 
century, it is not self-evident that the strategy of preponderance will be 
profitable. Further empirical research is needed to confirm or challenge this 
assertion of profitability. Such research has been undertaken to ascertain the 
cost-benefit trade-off of the British and Soviet empires. In both instances 
empire was found not to be a paying prop~s i t ion .~~ No a priori reason exists 
to suggest that a study of the American empire would reach a different 
conclusion.97 
Conclusion: Strategies, Interests, and Values 
It is unsurprising that having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the 
Soviet Union’s collapse, preponderance’s advocates want to keep the world the 
way it is. U.S. grand strategists view the prospect of change in international 
politics in much the same way that British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury did 
toward the end of the nineteenth century. “What ever happens will be for the 
worse,” Salisbury said, ”and therefore it is in our interest that as little should 
happen as p ~ s s i b l e . ” ~ ~  International politics, however, is dynamic, not static. 
U.S. hegemony cannot last indefinitely. As Paul Kennedy has observed, ”it 
simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of 
all the others . . .”99 Thus the strategy of preponderance must be reassessed. I 
have attempted to demonstrate that, in fact, the United States can pursue an 
alternative grand strategy without sacrificing its security. The debate between 
95. Odom, ”NATO’s Expansion,” p. 44. 
96. Charles Wolf, K.C. Yeh, Edmund D. Brunner, A. Gurwitz, and M.F. Lawrence, The Costs of the 
Soviet Empire (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1984), and Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, 
Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912 (Cam- 
bridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
97. To analyze the importance of maintaining undisturbed access to markets in Europe and East 
Asia, the following factors would need to be considered: the harm to the United States if access 
to these markets is disrupted, the likelihood of such disruption, and the availability of alternatives 
to reliance on these markets-such as increasing domestic demand to make up for lost exports 
and/or shifting to overseas markets in regions less vulnerable to political turmoil. Any economic 
benefits generated by interdependence would have to be offset against the ongoing costs of 
maintaining military forces dedicated to the task of pacifying Europe and East Asia and the 
potential dangers and costs the United States would incur if war broke out. Also, in weighing the 
overall impact of interdependence, it would be necessary as well to consider the opportunity costs 
of investing resources in military capabilities versus freeing up those resources for other economic 
and social purposes. 
98. Quoted in Kennedy, Realities Behind Diplomacy, p. 97. 
99. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, p. 533 (emphasis in original). 
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advocates of preponderance and offshore balancing, however, is about more 
than strategy; it is also about values. The United States is secure enough from 
external threat that, should it wish to do so, it could choose restraint over 
intervention, nation over empire, and an emphasis on domestic needs over 
external ambitions. And it should do so. In this sense, offshore balancing-an 
innenpolitik grand strategy that posits the primacy of domestic over foreign 
policy-is ethically driven: America’s mission lies at home, not abroad. As 
George F. Kennan says, there is nothing wrong with taking advantage of the 
Cold War’s end to focus on economic and social challenges at home: ”What 
we should want, in these circumstances, is the minimum, not the maximum, 
of external involvement.”’00 No doubt, some would maintain that offshore 
balancing is both selfish and immoral. In fact, such a policy is indeed self- 
interested and most assuredly moral. America First is an imperative, not a 
pejorative: Offshore balancing is a twenty-first-century grand strategy consis- 
tent with America’s interests and its values. 
100. George F. Kennan, Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy (New York W.W. 
Norton, 1993), p. 183. 
